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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an
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Moshe Babaioff∗, Nicole Immorlica†, Brendan Lucier‡, and S. Matthew Weinberg§
Abstract
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distribu-
tions, and his value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue.
It is known that an optimal mechanism in this setting may be quite complex, requiring ran-
domization [19] and menus of infinite size [15]. Hart and Nisan [17] have initiated a study of
two very simple pricing schemes for this setting: item pricing, in which each item is priced
at its monopoly reserve; and bundle pricing, in which the entire set of items is priced and
sold as one bundle. Hart and Nisan [17] have shown that neither scheme can guarantee more
than a vanishingly small fraction of the optimal revenue. In sharp contrast, we show that for
any distributions, the better of item and bundle pricing is a constant-factor approximation
to the optimal revenue. We further discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations
that are correlated across items.
1 Introduction
A monopolist seller has a collection of n items to sell. How should he sell the items to maximize
revenue given that the buyers are strategic? When there is only a single item for sale, and
a single buyer with value drawn from a distribution F , Myerson [23] shows that the optimal
sale protocol is straightforward: the seller should post a fixed take-it-or-leave-it price p chosen
to maximize p(1 − F (p)), the expected revenue. The optimality of this simple auction format
extends to the case of multiple buyers, as well.1 Despite the simplicity of the single-item
case, extending this solution to handle multiple items remains the primary open challenge in
mechanism design. While recent work in the computer science literature has made progress on
this front [2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21], it is still the case that very little is known about
optimal multi-item auctions, and what is known lacks the simplicity of Myerson’s single-item
auction.
Consider even the simplest multi-item scenario [17]: there is a single buyer2 with item
values drawn independently from distributions D1, . . . ,Dn, and whose value for a set of items
is additive. Even when there are only two items for sale, it is known that the revenue-optimal
mechanism may involve randomization [19], even to the extent of offering the buyer a choice
among infinitely many lotteries [15, 18]. This is troubling not only from the perspective of
analyzing optimal mechanisms, but also from the point of view of their usefulness. For an auction
to be useful in practice, it should be simple to describe and transparent in its execution. Indeed,
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†Microsoft Research, nicimm@microsoft.com
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6923736.
1This assumes regularity of the value distributions and that the buyers’ values are drawn independently.
2Note that if the seller has unlimited copies of each item for sale, then an auction for a single buyer directly
extends to the case of multiple buyers.
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Myerson’s single-item auction is exciting not only for its optimality, but also its practicality.3
The danger, then, is that revenue-optimal but complex mechanisms for multiple items may share
the fate of other mathematically optimal designs, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism,
which are very rarely used in practice [4]. It is therefore crucial to pair the study of revenue
optimization with an exploration of the power of simple auctions. In other words, what is the
relative strength of simple versus complex mechanisms?
The above question was posed in general by Hartline and Roughgarden [20], and by Hart
and Nisan specifically for the setting of a single additive buyer [17]. They proposed the following
suggestion for a simple multi-item auction: sell each item separately, posting a fixed price on
each one. The optimal price to set on item i is then argmaxp p(1 − Di(p)), mirroring the
single-item scenario. At first glance, it appears that perhaps this simple approach should be
optimal: the buyer’s value for each item is sampled independently, and her value for item i
doesn’t depend at all on what other items she receives due to additivity. There is absolutely
no interaction between the items at all from the buyer’s perspective, so why not sell the items
separately? Somewhat counter-intuitive, it turns out that this mechanism need not achieve the
optimal revenue. For example, suppose that there are n items, and that the buyer’s value for
each item is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Then the optimal price to set on a single item
is argmaxp p(1 − p) = 1/2, with a per-item revenue of 1/4 and hence a total revenue of n/4.
However, there is a different and equally straightforward mechanism that performs much better:
offer only the set of all items at a take-it-or-leave-it price of n(12 − ǫ) for some small ǫ > 0.
As n grows large, the probability that the sum of item values exceeds this price approaches 1,
and hence the buyer is almost certain to buy. This leads to a revenue slightly less than n/2,
a significant improvement over n/4. Hart and Nisan [17] show how to modify this example
to exhibit a gap of Ω(log(n)) by replacing the uniform distribution with an Equal-Revenue
distribution.4
What is going on in this example? The inherent problem is that the buyer’s value for the set
of all items concentrates tightly around its expectation. This is potentially helpful for revenue
generation, but the strategy of selling items separately cannot exploit this property. On the
other hand, the mechanism designed to target such concentration (selling only the grand bundle
at a fixed price) does very poorly in settings where concentration doesn’t occur; Hart and Nisan
show that this grand-bundle mechanism achieves only an Ω(n) approximation to the optimal
revenue in general. We must conclude that neither of these two simple mechanisms approximate
the optimal revenue to within a constant factor.
Our main result is that the maximum of the revenue generated by these two approaches —
either selling all items separately or selling only the grand bundle — is a constant-factor ap-
proximation to the optimal revenue. In other words, for any distribution of buyer values, either
selling items separately approximates the optimal revenue to within a constant factor, or else
bundling all items together does. Since a good approximation to the expected revenue of each
approach can be computed in polynomial time given an appropriate access to the distribution
(see Appendix G for a discussion of this claim), our results furthermore imply the first polytime
constant-factor approximation mechanism for the case of an additive buyer with independently
(and non-identically) distributed values, even without the restriction of simplicity.5 Further-
more, prior to our work, it was not even known if any deterministic mechanism could achieve
3This simplicity again assumes regularity and independence.
4The Equal-Revenue distribution has CDF F (x) = 0 for x ≤ 1, and F (x) = 1− 1/x for x ≥ 1.
5When the distributions are identical, and furthermore satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition, [16]
provides a PTAS. However, other recent results based on linear programming formulations ([1, 3, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11])
all run in time polynomial in the support of D. In many correlated settings, this is the right runtime to shoot for,
or the best one could hope for. But in our independent setting, this runtime will be exponential in n when ideally
we would like to run in time polynomial in n. We show that if we have meaningful access to the distributions in a
way that allows us to compute the optimal per-item reserves efficiently, then our mechanism runs in polynomial
time.
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a constant-factor approximation to the optimal mechanism, even without regard for simplicity
or computational efficiency.
Main Result (Informal). In any market with a single additive buyer and arbitrary independent
item value distributions, either selling every item separately or selling all items together as a
grand bundle generates at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
Our result nicely complements an active research area aimed at characterizing distributions
and valuations in which simple mechanisms are precisely optimal [2, 17, 24, 25]. In contrast
to that literature, we show that a maximum over simple mechanisms is approximately optimal,
for arbitrary distributions and additive valuations. Our result also echoes a similar line of
investigation for markets with unit-demand valuations in which a buyer’s value for a set of
items is his maximum value for an item in the set. In this setting, it is known [12, 13, 14] that
selling items separately achieves a constant approximation to the optimal revenue. Our result
illustrates that a similar approximation can be achieved for additive buyers, provided that we
also consider selling all items together as a grand bundle.
To obtain some intuition into our result, recall the example above with n items and uniformly-
distributed values. This example illustrates that selling all items separately may be a poor choice
when the value for the grand bundle concentrates around its expectation. What we show is
that, in fact, this is the only scenario in which selling all items separately is a poor choice. We
prove that if the total value for all items does not concentrate, then selling separately must
generate a constant fraction of optimal revenue.
Our argument makes use of a core-tail decomposition technique introduced by Li and Yao
[22] to study the revenue of selling items separately. Roughly speaking, the idea is to split the
support of each item’s value distribution into a “tail” (those values that are sufficiently large),
and a “core” (the remainder). One then attributes the revenue of the optimal mechanism to
the revenue extracted from values in the tail, plus the expected sum of values in the core. To
bound the optimal revenue, it then suffices to bound each of these two quantities separately. Li
and Yao define the tail of a distribution so that each value is in the tail with probability at most
1/n; they use this to prove that selling all items separately obtains a logarithmic approximation
to the optimal revenue (which is tight).
We apply a similar approach, but we define the boundary between core and tail in a different
way. We aim to strike a balance between two opposing goals: we want the boundaries to be high
enough that the probability of being in the tail is low, which will imply that the revenue from the
tail is small relative to selling items separately. At the same time, we want values in the core to be
small enough that, subject to their sum being large, the summust necessarily concentrate around
its expectation (which would imply that bundling all items together achieves good revenue).
To meet these two goals, we design thresholds that are adapted to the revenue contributions
of different items, which makes the core smaller (relative to non-adaptive thresholds) when the
value distributions are highly asymmetric. This gives us the extra flexibility needed to derive a
constant-factor approximation.
We apply the same methodology to prove that when there are many buyers (with valuations
that are not necessarily samples from identical distributions), selling all items separately yields
an O(log(n)) approximation to the optimal mechanism. This bound is asymptotically tight, as
Hart and Nisan have presented a lower bound that matches this for just a single buyer. Prior
to our work, no non-trivial bounds were known on the revenue of selling separately to many
buyers, or even on the revenue on any class of mechanisms. Furthermore, the observation that
selling separately fails only under concentration has implications in this setting as well: we
further show that unless the maximum attainable welfare (of all buyers together) concentrates,
that selling items separately again obtains a constant-factor approximation. However, with
many buyers the concentration of welfare does not imply that selling the grand bundle together
obtains a constant-factor approximation. Indeed, unlike in the single-buyer case, one cannot
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improve the approximation ratio by using bundling: we prove that the Ω(log(n)) lower bound
applies against the better of selling separately and together as well. This realization motivates
our first open problem:
Open Problem 1. Is there a “simple,” approximately optimal mechanism for many additive
buyers with independent values?
In attempt to make progress on this problem, we turn to a subclass of deterministic mech-
anisms that we call “partition mechanisms.” A partition mechanism first partitions the items
into disjoint bundles, then sells each bundle separately. This natural class of mechanisms clearly
generalizes both selling separately and selling together, so we study the performance of the opti-
mal mechanism in this class relative to that of others. On this front, we show that unfortunately
the revenue of the optimal mechanism for many independent buyers can still be an Ω(log n)
factor larger than that of the optimal partition mechanism, and further that revenue of the op-
timal partition mechanism can be an Ω(log n) factor larger than the better of selling separately
and together.6
Finally, we study the performance of selling separately and together against partition mech-
anisms for a single buyer whose values for the items may be arbitrarily correlated. While neither
class of mechanisms can guarantee any finite factor of the optimal revenue ([7, 17]), the ques-
tion remains as to whether simple mechanisms can approximate more complex (though still
suboptimal) mechanisms in the presence of correlation. To this end, we prove that selling items
separately obtains an O(log n)-approximation the optimal obtainable revenue by a partition
mechanism, and that this is tight. In fact, we show a gap of Ω(log n) between the better of
selling separately and together versus the optimal partition mechanism. We include several
tables in Appendix A displaying the relative power of the various classes of mechanisms studied
in this paper, noting here that as of our work, all upper and lower bounds are (asymptotically)
matching.
Our paper leaves several natural open problems for future work. The first was already stated
and concerns extending our results to many buyers. A second problem concerns extending our
results beyond additive valuations. As for both unit-demand and additive valuations a constant-
factor approximation mechanism is now known, one could naturally ask if such a result is
also achievable for valuations that generalize both unit-demand and additive. One potential
instantiation is a buyer with a k-demand valuation; i.e., additive, but wants at most k items.
A significantly more challenging instantiation is the class of gross-substitute valuations.
Open Problem 2. Is there a “simple,” approximately optimal mechanism for single buyer with
a k-demand valuation? With a gross-substitute valuation?
Finally, a third problem concerns extending our results to settings with mild (but not arib-
trary) correlation. This approach was fruitful in [14] for the “common base-value” model.7
Open Problem 3. Is there a “simple,” approximately optimal mechanism for a single additive
buyer whose value for n items is sampled from a common base-value distribution? What about
other models of limited correlation?
2 Preliminaries
The setting we consider is that of a single monopolist seller with n heterogeneous and indivis-
ible items for sale to m additive, risk-neutral, quasi-linear consumers (buyers). That is, each
6Clearly, no example can exhibit both gaps simultaneously as selling separately achieves an O(log n)-
approximation to the optimal revenue.
7In the common base-value model, the buyer has n + 1 distributions D0, . . . , Dn, and samples vi from each
Di. Her value for item i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is then v0 + vi, and v0 is called the “base-value.”
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consumer j has a value vij for item i. While our main results are for the setting of a single
buyer, we will define our setting more generally; this will be useful when discussing extensions.
If a randomized outcome awards consumer j item i with probability πij and charges him a price
pj in expectation, then his utility for this outcome is
∑
i vijπij − pj. Each value vij is sampled
independently from a known distribution Dij . We make no assumptions on Dij whatsoever. We
refer to D as the joint mn-dimensional distribution over all consumers’ values for all items, Di
as the m-dimensional distribution over all consumers’ values for item i. Furthermore, we denote
by ~v a random sample from D, ~vi a random sample from Di. We also denote the maximum
value for item i as v∗i = maxj{vij}.
We are interested in analyzing mechanisms at Bayes-Nash equilibrium of buyer behavior,
with an eye toward maximizing revenue at equilibrium. By the revelation principle, we can
restrict attention to mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible (i.e., truthful).8 As
usual, we also impose the individual rationality constraint, saying that every buyer’s utility is
non-negative when truthful.
We use the following terminology to discuss the revenue obtainable by various types of
mechanisms, where the first three are taken from [17].
• Rev(D): The optimal revenue obtained by any (possibly randomized) truthful mechanism
when the consumer profile is drawn from D.
• SRev(D): The optimal revenue obtained by auctioning items separately when the con-
sumer profile is drawn from D. That is, the revenue obtained by running Myerson’s
optimal auction separately for each item.
• BRev(D): The optimal revenue obtained by auctioning the grand bundle when the con-
sumer profile is drawn from D. That is, the revenue obtained by running Myerson’s
optimal auction when treating the grand bundle as a single item.
• PRev(D): The optimal revenue obtained by any partition mechanism when the consumer
profile is drawn from D. That is, the maximal revenue obtained by first partitioning the
items into disjoint bundles, and then running Myerson’s optimal auction separately for
each bundle, treating each bundle as a single item.
Given a distribution D over profiles, we will often consider the welfare
∑
i v
∗
i of a consumer
profile ~v drawn from D. We will write Val(D) for the expected welfare, so that Val(D) =
E~v∼D [
∑
i v
∗
i ]. We will also write var(D) = var~v∼D(
∑
i v
∗
i ) for the variance of the welfare.
We will make use of some results from [17] that provide useful bounds on Rev(D). We
include proofs in Appendix B for completeness. Lemma 1 is stated and proved directly in [17].
Lemma 2 is not directly stated nor proved, but is similar to an implicit result from [17].
In the lemma below, we think of D and D′ as being distributions over values for disjoint
sets of items, for the same set of m consumers. The distribution D ×D′ then draws values for
those two sets of items, independently, from D and D′ respectively.
Lemma 1. ([17]) Rev(D ×D′) ≤ Val(D) +Rev(D′).
The next result establishes a weak bound on Rev(D) with respect to SRev(D).
Lemma 2. Rev(D) ≤ nmSRev(D).
8As it turns out, all of the mechanisms we describe will also satisfy the stronger property of dominant strategy
truthfulness.
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3 The Core Decomposition
We make use of an idea developed by Li and Yao [22] called the “core” of a value distribution
for a single consumer. In order to obtain our stronger results for a single consumer and also
extend to many consumers, we define the core differently but in the same spirit. The idea is to
separate each m-dimensional value distribution for each item into the core and the tail, the tail
being the part where some consumer has an unusually high value for the item. Then the core of
the entire nm-dimensional distribution is the product of all the cores, and the tail is everything
else.
3.1 Defining the Core and Prior Results
Below we formalize the notion of the core. We introduce some notation that will be used
throughout the paper. By the “null” distribution, we mean a distribution whose product with
any other distribution is also a null distribution, and that outputs ⊥ with probability 1.
• ri: The optimal revenue obtainable by selling just item i (using Myerson’s optimal auc-
tion).
• r: ∑i ri. The same as SRev(D) but cleaner to write in formulas.
• ti: A profile of parameters, one per item, to define the separation between the core and
tail of distribution Fi. We will think of ti as a multiplier applied to ri. The core for item
i will be supported on the interval [0, tiri], and the tail for item i will be supported on
(tiri,∞). Different results throughout the paper will specify different choices for ti.
• pi: Pr[v∗i > tiri], the probability that the highest value on item i lies in the tail. Note
that this may be 0.
• DCi : The core of Di, the conditional distribution of ~vi conditioned on v∗i ≤ tiri. Note that
this may be the null distribution if pi = 1.
• DTi : The tail of Di, the conditional distribution of ~vi conditioned on v∗i > tiri. Note that
this may be the null distribution if pi = 0.
• A: Throughout our notation, we will use A to represent a subset of items. We often think
of A as the items whose values lie in the tail of their respective distributions.
• DTA: A is a subset of items, and DTA is a product distribution equal to ×i∈ADTi .
• DCA : A is a subset of items, and DCA is a product distribution equal to ×i/∈ADCi .
• DA: DCA ×DTA. Note that this product is taken over the tail of items in A and the core
of items not in A. In other words, DA is the distribution D, conditioned on v
∗
i > tiri if
i ∈ A and conditioned on v∗i ≤ tiri if i /∈ A.
• pA: Pr[~v ∈ support(DA)]. This is equal to (
∏
i∈A pi)(
∏
i/∈A(1− pi)).
Before stating our core decomposition lemma, we present some known results about the
core. The lemmas below were either stated explicitly in [22] or [17], or use ideas from one of
those papers. We put a citation in the statement of such lemmas, but include all proofs in
Appendix C for completeness.
Lemma 3. ([22]) pi ≤ 1/ti for all i.
Lemma 4. ([22]) Rev(DCi ) ≤ ri and Rev(DTi ) ≤ ri/pi.
Lemma 5. ([17]) Rev(D) ≤∑A pARev(DA).
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3.2 The Core Decomposition Lemma
In this section we state our Core Decomposition Lemma, which relates the optimal revenue
from a distribution D to the revenue and welfare that can be extracted from the tail and core
of D. This result is similar in spirit to the core lemma of [22].
Our first result, Lemma 6, is our main decomposition lemma. The lemma states that the
optimal revenue from distribution D can be split into a contribution from the core of D and a
contribution from the tail of D. One might hope for a bound of the form “the optimal revenue
from D is at most the optimal revenue from the tail plus the optimal revenue from the core.”
Indeed, such a bound is attainable for a single buyer [22], but is problematic for many buyers,
see Section 4.4 and Appendix 3 in [17] for a discussion. We will therefore settle for a weaker
bound: the optimal revenue from the tail plus the expected welfare from the core. We also note
that the approach of Li and Yao eventually upper bounds the optimal revenue of the core with
the expected welfare anyway.
Lemma 6 (Core Decomposition). Rev(D) ≤ Val(DC∅ ) +
∑
A pARev(D
T
A)
Proof. By Lemma 1,
Rev(DA) ≤ Val(DCA) +Rev(DTA)
for all A. Also, since Val(DCA) is the expected sum of values for items not in A, we have
Val(DCA) ≤ Val(DC∅ ).
By Lemma 5,
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pARev(DA)
≤
∑
A
pA
(
Val(DCA) +Rev(D
T
A)
)
≤
(∑
A
pA
)
Val(DC∅ ) +
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A).
As
∑
A pA = 1 the desired result follows.
4 Revenue Bounds for a Single Buyer
In this section we focus on the case of a single buyer, m = 1. We will work toward proving
our main result, which is that max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} is a constant-factor approximation
to Rev(D) in this setting. Our argument will make use of the core decomposition, described
in the previous section. We will begin with a simpler result that illustrates our techniques:
that Rev(D) is at most (lnn + 3) times SRev(D). A logarithmic approximation was already
established in [22]; we obtain a slightly tighter bound, but the primary purpose of presenting
this result is as a warm-up to introduce our techniques and those of [22]. We will then show
how this bound can be improved to a constant by considering the maximum of SRev(D) and
BRev(D).
4.1 Warm-up: (lnn + 3)SRev ≥ Rev
We first give a simple application of our approach to provide a bound on SRev vs. Rev, which
is slightly improved relative to the bound obtained in [22].
Theorem 1. For a single buyer, and any c > 0, (2 + 1/c + ln c + lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
This is minimized at c = 1, yielding (lnn+ 3)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
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The idea of the proof is to consider the core decomposition of D, choosing ti = cn for each
item i. By the Core Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 6), Theorem 1 follows if we can bound the
optimal revenue from the tail and the expected welfare from the core, given this choice of {ti}i.
We begin with Proposition 1, which effectively shows that for constant c, the revenue from
the tail is at most a constant times SRev(D). The intuition behind this result is that each
item i lies in the tail with probability pi ≤ 1/ti = 1/cn, and hence a large fraction of the time
there will be at most a single item whose value lies in the tail. In this case, the revenue from
the values in the tail is certainly no more than SRev(D), since the optimal mechanism can
do no better than setting the optimal price for the single item present. To bound the revenue
contribution when many values lie in the tail, the relatively weak bound in Lemma 2 will suffice.
Proposition 1. For a single buyer, and any c > 0, if ti = cn for all i, then
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤
(1 + 1/c)SRev(D).
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, Rev(DTA) ≤ |A|SRev(DTA) ≤
∑
i∈A |A|ri/pi. Therefore, we
may rewrite the sum by first summing over item i, and then sets A containing i, obtaining:∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
i
∑
A∋i
|A|pAri/pi.
We now wish to interpret the term
∑
A∋i |A|pA/pi. Observe that pA/pi is exactly the probability
that the set A of items are in the tail, conditioned on i being in the tail, and |A| is just the
size of A. Summing over all A ∋ i therefore yields the expected size of the set of items in the
tail, conditioned on i being on the tail.9 Clearly this expectation is just 1 +
∑
j 6=i pj , which is
at most 1+ 1/c by Lemma 3. As we have just observed that
∑
A∋i |A|pA/pi ≤ 1+ 1/c, we have
now shown that
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
i(1 + 1/c)ri, which is exactly (1 + 1/c)SRev(D).
Having established a bound on the revenue of the tail, we turn to the welfare of the core.
For this, we use the definition of ri = SRev(Di) to directly bound Pr[vi > x] for all x, and
then take an expectation over the range of the core.
Proposition 2. For a single buyer, and any c > 0, if ti = cn for all i, then (1 + ln c +
lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Val(DC∅ ).
Proof. Note that Val(DC∅ ) =
∑
iVal(D
C
i ) ≤
∑
i
∫ cnri
0 Pr[vi > x]dx. The last inequality would
be equality if we replaced vi with a random variable drawn from D
C
i , but since vi stochastically
dominates such a random variable, we get an inequality instead. As the optimal revenue of Di
is ri, this means that Pr[vi > x] ≤ min{1, ri/x}. So we have
Val(DCi ) ≤
∫ ri
0
dx+
∫ cnri
ri
ri/xdx = ri + ri(ln(cnri)− ln(ri)) = ri(1 + lnn+ ln c)
Summing this guarantee over all i yields the proposition.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 with Lemma 6 yields Theorem 1.
4.2 Main Result: 6 ·max{SRev,BRev} ≥ Rev
In this section we prove our main result, showing that the best of selling items separately and
bundling all of them together is a constant-factor approximation to the optimal mechanism.
The proof will follow a similar skeleton to that of Section 4.1, by proving propositions similar to
9This observation is due to Aviad Rubinstein, and we thank him for allowing us to include it. An earlier
version of this paper presented a (lnn+ 5)-approximation in Theorem 1 and a 7.5-approximation in Theorem 2.
This observation improved those factors to (lnn+ 3) and 6, respectively.
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Propositions 1 and 2. The notable difference is that we will need to be more careful in defining
the core.
When all Di are identical, the approach in Section 4.1 (setting each ti = cn) can be leveraged
to yield the bound O(1) · BRev ≥ Rev ([22]), but fails in the case that a small number k of
items contributes the majority of the optimal revenue. To see the problem, note that the
definition of the core depends on the number of items n, but this can be made arbitrarily large
by adding extra items of negligible value. The effect is that the core is potentially larger than
necessary when value distributions are asymmetric. What we need instead is for ti to depend
on the value distribution Di. We let ti scale inverse proportionally to ri, so that high-revenue
items are more likely to occur in the tail. This allows us to capture scenarios in which revenue
comes primarily from one heavy item (by analyzing the tail), as well as instances driven by
the combined contribution of many light items (by analyzing the core). Indeed, note that if we
set ti = cr/ri, then the boundary between core and tail becomes tiri = cr = cSRev(D) for
each item. This turns out to be precisely the threshold that we need to attain constant-factor
approximation bounds for both the core and the tail, simultaneously.
Theorem 2. For a single buyer, Rev(D) ≤ 6max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}.
As in Theorem 1, our approach will be to apply the Core Decomposition Lemma (Lemma
6) with an appropriate choice of values ti, then bound separately the revenue from the tail and
the welfare from the core. As discussed above, we will make the non-uniform choice ti = r/ri
for each i.
Proposition 3. For a single buyer, when ti = r/ri for each i,
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 2SRev(D).
Proof. We begin similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, using Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 to write
Rev(DTA) ≤ |A|SRev(DTA) ≤
∑
i∈A |A|ri/pi. Again, summing this over all A yields:∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
i
∑
A∋i
|A|pAri/pi.
Just like in Proposition 1,
∑
A∋i |A|pA/pi is exactly the expected number of items in the
tail, conditioned on i being in the tail. It’s again clear that this sum is exactly 1+
∑
j 6=i pj. By
Lemma 3, this is at most 1+
∑
j 6=i 1/tj . By our choice of ti, the second term is upper bounded
by 1, as tj = r/rj and
∑
j rj = r. Therefore,
∑
A∋i |A|pA/pi ≤ 2, and
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤
2SRev(D).
We now turn to bounding the welfare from the core. We will use the small range of the core
to derive an upper bound on the variance of its welfare. This will allow us to conclude that
the welfare is highly concentrated whenever it is sufficiently large relative to SRev(D). Thus,
if the welfare is “small” compared to SRev(D), then selling separately extracts most of the
welfare (within the core); otherwise the welfare concentrates and so bundling extracts most of
the welfare (within the core). The following lemma of [22] will be helpful for this approach; its
proof appears in Appendix D for completeness.
Lemma 7. ([22]) Let F be a one-dimensional distribution with optimal revenue at most c
supported on [0, tc]. Then var(F ) ≤ (2t− 1)c2.
Corollary 1. For a single buyer, and any choice of ti, var(D
C
i ) ≤ 2tir2i .
Proof. Rev(DCi ) ≤ ri, and the distribution DCi is supported on [0, tiri]. Therefore, plugging
into Lemma 7 (and relaxing) yields the desired bound.
Proposition 4. For a single buyer, when all ti = r/ri, max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ 14Val(DC∅ ).
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Proof. There are two cases to consider. If Val(DC∅ ) ≤ 4r, then we have that SRev(D) = r ≥
1
4Val(D
C
∅ ) as required.
On the other hand, if Val(DC∅ ) ≥ 4r, then Corollary 1 tells us that var(DCi ) ≤ 2tir2i .
Summing over all i and recalling that ti = r/ri we get
var(DC∅ ) =
∑
i
var(DCi ) ≤ 2
∑
i
tir
2
i = 2r
2.
So var(DC∅ ) ≤ 2r2 and Val(DC∅ ) ≥ 4r. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we get
Pr
[∑
i
vi ≤ 2
5
·Val(DC∅ )
]
≤ 2r
2(
1− 25
)2 ·Val(DC∅ )2
≤ 25r
2
72r2
=
25
72
.
SinceBRev(D) is at least the revenue obtained by setting price 25 ·Val(DC∅ ) on the grand bundle,
this implies BRev(D) ≥ (25 ·Val(DC∅ ))·4772 = 47180 ·Val(DC∅ ). As 47180 > 14 , BRev(D) > 14Val(DC∅ )
as required.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4 with Lemma 6 yields Theorem 2. To our knowledge, the
best known lower bound on max{SRev,BRev} vs. Rev is 1.05, provided by an example
in [15]. The example has two items with D1 = U{1, 2} and D2 = U{1, 3}, with Rev = 2.625,
SRev = 2.5, and BRev = 2.25. It is an interesting open question to close the gap between
1.05 and 6, either by tightening our analysis or providing better lower bounds.
5 Revenue Bounds for Multiple Buyers
Here we extend our results to multiple buyers with valuations sampled independently (but not
necessarily identically). We will refer to this as the independent setting, as the buyers’ valuations
are independent and furthermore each buyer’s item values are also drawn independently. We
first show in Theorem 3 that for the independent setting, selling items separately achieves a
logarithmic (in n) approximation to the optimal revenue. We next show in Theorem 5 that
like in the single buyer case, the only case in which selling items separately fails to achieve
a good approximation, is the case that welfare is highly concentrated. Unfortunately, such
concentration is no longer sufficient to achieve a constant approximation by selling all items
together. This is so because even though the welfare is concentrated, the partition that provides
such welfare can change dramatically between realizations. Indeed, in Proposition 8 we show
not only that BRev(D) fails to provide a constant approximation to the optimal mechanism,
but even PRev(D) fails, and this is so even when item values are sampled i.i.d. for all items and
buyers. Finally, in Proposition 9 we show that in the independent setting, PRev(D) cannot be
approximated well by max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}.
5.1 An Upper Bound: (lnn + 6)SRev ≥ Rev
We first show that selling items separately achieves a logarithmic (in n) approximation to the
optimal revenue.
Theorem 3. For arbitrarily many buyers, in the independent setting, (2 + 2e1/4 + ln 4 +
lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D). (Note that 2 + 2e1/4 + ln 4 < 6.)
Our proof will proceed via amplification. We will begin with the (awful) bound on SRev vs.
Rev from Lemma 2, then show in Theorem 4 how to amplify any such bound into an improved
bound. We will then iterate this amplification process over and over, until we reach the desired
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logarithmic approximation (which will be a fixed point of the amplification process). To prove
the amplification theorem, we use an approach similar to the single-buyer analysis from Section
4.1. That is, we will apply the Core Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 6), then bound the revenue
of the tail and the welfare of the core with respect to SRev(D).
Theorem 4 (Amplification). For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, assume
that for some a > 1 it holds that anSRev(D) ≥ Rev(D). Then, for any c ≥ 1, (2 +
2e1/ca/c + ln c + ln a + lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D) as well. Setting c = 1 yields (2 + 2e1/a +
ln a+ lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
To prove Theorem 4, we will apply the Core Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 6), using
ti = c · a · n for each i. Theorem 4 will then follow from bounds on the revenue from the tail
and the expected welfare from the core, which we establish in the following propositions.
Proposition 5. For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, if ti = c · a · n for all i
and anSRev(D) ≥ Rev(D), then ∑A pARev(DTA) ≤ (1 + 2e1/ca/c)SRev(D).
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to that of Proposition 1. The only difference is that we
start with the fact that Rev(DTA) ≤ a|A|SRev(DTA) instead of just |A|, and make use of the fact
that when there is only one item, SRev(DTA) = Rev(D
T
A). We include the details in Appendix
E for completeness.
The following bound on the welfare from the core follows in a manner similar to Proposition
2. We defer its proof to Appendix E.
Proposition 6. For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, if ti = c · a · n for all
i, then (1 + ln c+ ln a+ lnn)SRev(D) ≥ Val(DC∅ ).
Theorem 4 then follows from Propositions 5 and 6, together with Lemma 6. We now show
how to prove Theorem 3 using Theorem 4.
Proof (of Theorem 3). By Lemma 2, we may apply Theorem 4 starting with a = m. This yields
a bound of the form a′nSRev(D) ≥ Rev(D) for some new a′. We can then apply Theorem 4
again, taking a to be this new value a′. We can iteratively apply Theorem 4 over and over until
we either reach a fixed point (with respect to the value of a) or reach a = 1. One can verify that,
for all n ≥ 2, no a ≥ 4 is a fixed point and that the function f(a) = (2+2e1/a+ln a+lnn)/n is
continuous. Therefore, we can always iterate until a ≤ 4 and then apply Theorem 4 with a = 4,
yielding the desired bound.
5.2 A Concentration Result
We next present a characterization of when SRev(D) is a constant-factor approximation to
Rev(D) for the independent setting with multiple buyers. We will show (in Theorem 5, below)
that this occurs unless the welfare of D is sufficiently well concentrated around its expectation.
We begin with a corollary of Theorem 3, which will be useful for our analysis.
Corollary 2. For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, 4nSRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
Proof. This is a direct application of Theorem 3 and noting that 6+ lnn ≤ 4n for all n ≥ 2.
We next prove an alternative bound on the revenue from the tail of the distribution D,
using a familiar choice of ti. The proof, which closely follows that of Proposition 3, appears in
Appendix E.
Proposition 7. For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, if we choose ti = 4r/ri
for all i, then
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 5SRev(D).
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We are now ready to establish the claimed bound between SRev and Rev, subject to the
welfare of D not being too concentrated around its expectation.
Definition 1. We say that a one-dimensional distribution F is d-concentrated if there exists a
value C such that Prx∼F [|x− C| ≤ C/2] ≥ d.
Theorem 5. For arbitrarily many buyers in the independent setting, and any c ≥ 4√2, either
(c+5)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D) or the welfare of D (the random variable with expectation Val(D))
is (3/4− 24
c2
)-concentrated.
Proof. Let all ti = 4r/ri. Then combining Proposition 7 and Lemma 6 yields
5SRev(D) +Val(DC∅ ) ≥ Rev(D).
There are two cases to consider. Maybe cSRev(D) ≥ Val(DC∅ ). In this case, we have (c +
5)SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
On the other hand, maybe Val(DC∅ ) ≥ cSRev(D). In this case, Corollary 1 tells us that
var(DCi ) ≤ 2tir2i . Summing over all i and recalling that ti = 4r/ri, we get
var(DC∅ ) ≤ 2
∑
i
tir
2
i = 2
∑
i
(4r)ri = 8r
2.
So var(DC∅ ) ≤ 8r2 and Val(DC∅ ) ≥ cr. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we get
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
v∗i −Val(DC∅ )
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ Val(DC∅ )/2
]
≤ 8r
2
Val(DC∅ )
2/4
≤ 32r
2
c2r2
=
32
c2
meaning that the welfare of DC∅ is (1 − 32c2 )-concentrated. The last step is observing that
~v is sampled in the support of DC∅ with probability exactly
∏
i(1 − pi). As
∑
i pi ≤ 1/4
and each pi ≤ 1/4, this is minimized when exactly one pi is 1/4 and the rest are 0, yielding∏
i(1−pi) = 3/4. So with probability at least 3/4 ~v is in the support of DC∅ . When this happens,
the welfare is (1− 32c2 ) concentrated. So the welfare of D is (3/4 − 24c2 )-concentrated.
5.3 A Lower Bound: PRev ≤ Rev/Ω(log n) even for i.i.d. Item Values
We next show that there is a setting with many buyers with item valuations that are sampled
i.i.d from the same distribution, for which PRev(D) (and thus also max{SRev(D),BRev(D)})
provides a poor approximation to Rev(D).
Proposition 8. There exists a setting with n items and many buyers, with item valuations that
are sampled i.i.d from the same distribution, for which PRev(D) ≤ Rev(D)/Ω(log n).
Proof. Consider a setting with n items and
√
n buyers with the following value distributions.
For every item i and buyer j, the distribution Di,j such that the value is 0 with probability
1 − 1/√n, and with the remaining probability it is sampled from a distribution F with CDF
F (x) = 1−x−1 for x ∈ [1, n1/8] and F (x) = 1 for x > n1/8 (an Equal-Revenue distribution with
all mass above n1/8 moved to an atom at n1/8). To prove the claim we show in Lemma 11 in
Appendix E that Rev(D) ∈ Ω(n log n) while PRev(D) ∈ O(n) (actually, since SRev ∈ Ω(n)
it holds that PRev(D) ∈ Θ(n)).
5.4 A Lower Bound: max{SRev,BRev} ≤ PRev/Ω(log n)
We next show that there is a setting with many buyers with item valuations that are sam-
pled independently (but not identically), for which max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} provides a poor
approximation to PRev(D).
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Proposition 9. There exists a independent setting with n items and many buyers for which
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≤ PRev(D)/Ω(log n).
Proof. Fix n such that
√
n is an integer. Consider a setting with
√
n buyers, and a partition the
items to
√
n disjoint sets of size
√
n. Buyer k has value 0 for every item that is not in the k-th
set of items, and for item in that set his value is sampled independently from an Equal-Revenue
distribution.
Clearly, SRev(D) = n. BRev(D) is the same as the revenue that BRev(D) can get in a
setting with
√
n buyers and only
√
n items for which each item value is sampled i.i.d. from an
Equal-Revenue distribution. That revenue is O(
√
n log
√
n). We conclude that
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ∈ O(n). PRev(D) on the other hand, can bundle each of the
sets of size
√
n separately and sell it to the interested buyer, getting a total revenue of
√
n ·
Ω(
√
n log
√
n) = Ω(n log n).
6 One Buyer with Correlated Values
In this section, we study the relationship between SRev(D), Max{SRev(D), BRev(D)}, and
PRev(D) for a single buyer with correlated values. The prior work of [17, 7] already shows
that there is no hope of obtaining a finite bound between any of these quantities and Rev(D)
because they are all deterministic, even when there are only two items. But it is still important
to understand the relationship between these mechanisms of varying complexity even if their
revenue cannot compare to that of the optimal mechanism. We show in Theorem 6 that for any
distribution D for a single buyer, possibly even correlated, SRev(D) is a O(log n) approxima-
tion to BRev(D), and thus also to Max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} and PRev(D).10 We then show
in Proposition 10 that this bound is tight, Max{SRev(D), BRev(D)} ≤ PRev(D)/Ω(log n).
In other words, SRev(D) provides a logarithmic approximation to PRev(D), but taking
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} can’t guarantee anything better.
We start by showing that SRev(D) is a O(log n) approximation to BRev(D). The proof
of the theorem appears in Appendix F.
Theorem 6. For any n-dimensional value distribution D for a single buyer (possibly correlated
across items), BRev(D) ≤ 5 ln(n)SRev(D). Therefore, PRev(D) ≤ 5 ln(n)SRev(D) as well.
Finally, we show that there is a setting with one buyer (and correlated item values) for
which max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} provides poor approximation not only to Rev(D) but even
to PRev(D). The proof of the proposition appears in Appendix F.
Proposition 10. There exists a (correlated) distribution D of the valuation of a single buyer
over n items for which max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≤ PRev(D)/Ω(log n).
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A Summary of Known Results
Table 1 and Table 2 presents the best results known for one additive buyer with item values
sampled independently or arbitrarily, respectively. Additionally, Table 3 presents the best
results known for many additive buyers in the independent setting. In each cell there is the
known upper and lower bounds of the ratio between the corresponding column quantity and row
quantity, and the source of the result. For example, in table 1, table entry that corresponds to
the row marked by max{SRev,BRev} and column marked by Rev there is the upper bound
of 6 that we have presented in Theorem 2 for the ratio Rev/max{SRev,BRev} which holds
for every distribution D. Results from this paper that are not implied by other results appear
in bold. Results that are implied from other results, point to the results that imply them.
Table 1: One buyer, independent item values
max{SRev,BRev} Rev
SRev O(log n) [→] O(log n) [22]
Ω(log n) [17] Ω(log n) [←]
max{SRev,BRev} 1 6 [Thm 2]
1 Ω(1) [Folklore]
Table 2: One buyer, correlated item values
max{SRev,BRev} PRev Rev
SRev O(log n) [→] O(log n) [Thm 6] 0
Ω(log n) [17] Ω(log n) [↓] ∞ [↓]
max{SRev,BRev} 1 O(log n) [↑] 0
1 Ω(log n) [Prop 10] ∞ [↓]
PRev 1 0
1 ∞ [17]
B Omitted Proofs from Section 2
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 require some technical lemmas from [17]. We include them
below with proofs for completeness. In Lemma 8 below, D and D′ are distributions over
values for disjoint sets of items for the same consumers, and D and D′ may be dependent. By
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Table 3: Many buyers, independent item values
max{SRev,BRev} PRev Rev
SRev O(log n) [→] O(log n) [→] O(log n) [Thm 3]
Ω(log n) [17] Ω(log n) [←] Ω(log n) [←]
max{SRev,BRev} 1 O(log n) [↑] O(log n) [↑]
1 Ω(log n) [Prop 9] Ω(log n) [↓]
PRev 1 O(log n) [↑]
1 Ω(log n) [Prop 8]
Rev(D,D′) we mean the optimal revenue obtainable by selling to consumers whose values for
items is sampled from the joint distribution according to D and D′.
Lemma 8. (“Marginal Mechanism” [17]) Rev(D,D′) ≤ Val(D) + E~v←D[Rev(D′|~v)].
Proof. We will establish a lower bound on E~v←DRev(D
′|~v) by constructing a truthful mecha-
nism for selling items in the support of D′, based on one for those in the support of (D,D′).
First, sample values ~v from D for each consumer. Then announce that whenever a consumer
would have received an item in the support of D, he will instead receive money equal to the
(make-believe) value sampled from D. Note that, due to this announcement, each consumer
now has a value for each item in the support of D corresponding to the sampled value profile.
Then run the optimal truthful mechanism for selling items in the support of (D,D′). Con-
ditioned on ~v, this mechanism is truthful. Therefore, conditioned on ~v, the revenue of this
mechanism is upper bounded by Rev(D′|~v). Taking an expectation over all ~v ← D, we see that
the total expected revenue obtained by this procedure is upper bounded by E~v←D[Rev(D
′|~v)].
Also taking an expectation over all ~v ← D, we see that the expected revenue obtained is exactly
Rev(D,D′) minus the expected amount of money given away via the reduction, which upper
bouned by Val(D). These two observations together prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1: This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 8. as D and D′ are independent,
Rev(D′|~v) = Rev(D′), for all ~v. ✷
Lemma 9. (“Sub-Domain Stitching” [17]) Let S1, . . . , Sk form a partition of R
nm and let
si = Pr[~v ∈ Si|~v ← D]. Then
∑
i siRev(D|~v ∈ Si) ≥ Rev(D).
Proof. Let M be the optimal mechanism for D, and RevM (D) denote the revenue of M when
consumers are sampled from D. Then we have RevM (D) =
∑
i siRevM (D|~v ∈ Si). We also
clearly have Rev(D) = RevM (D), and RevM (D|~v ∈ Si) ≤ Rev(D|~v ∈ Si) for all i, proving
the lemma.
In the lemma below, again think of D and D′ as independent distributions for the same
consumers over disjoint sets of items.
Lemma 10. (“Marginal Mechanism on Sub-Domain” [17]) S be any subset of Rnm, and s =
Pr[(~v,~v′) ∈ S|(~v,~v′) ← D × D′]. Then sRev(D × D′|(~v,~v′) ∈ S) ≤ sVal(D|(~v,~v′) ∈ S) +
Rev(D′).
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Proof. Let 1E denote the indicator variable for event E (that is 1 when E occurs or 0 otherwise).
Then when we write 1ED, we mean the distribution that first samples ~v ← D, and outputs ~v if
the event E occurs, and 0 otherwise. In particular, when we write 1(~v,~v′)∈SD×D′, we mean to
first sample (~v,~v′) ← D ×D′, and then output (~v,~v′) if (~v,~v′) ∈ S, or ~0 otherwise. We’ll also
abuse notation slightly and write 1(~v,~v′)∈SD to mean that one should sample (~v,~v
′)← D ×D′,
and output only ~v if (~v,~v′) ∈ S (or ~0 otherwise). Then it’s clear that sRev(D × D′|(~v,~v′) ∈
S) = Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD ×D′), which can be rewritten as Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD,1(~v,~v′)∈SD′). Applying
Lemma 8, we get:
Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD,1(~v,~v′)∈SD
′) ≤ Val(1(~v,~v′)∈SD) + E~v←1(~v,~v′)∈SD[Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD′|~v)].
Now, define S~v = {~v′|(~v,~v′) ∈ S}. Then clearly, the distribution (1(~v,~v′)∈SD′|~v) is exactly the
same as 1~v′∈S~vD
′, because D and D′ are independent. Finally, it’s clear that Rev(1~v′∈S~vD
′) ≤
Rev(D′), as any mechanism with no positive transfers makes at least as much revenue on D′
as 1~v′∈S~vD
′. So in conclusion, Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD
′|~v) ≤ Rev(D′) for all ~v, and therefore we have
E~v←1(~v,~v′)∈SD
[Rev(1(~v,~v′)∈SD
′|~v)] ≤ Rev(D′) as well.
The final step is simply observing that Val(1(~v,~v′)∈SD) = sVal(D|(~v,~v′) ∈ S).
Proof of Lemma 2: We first prove the lemma in the case of m = 1 by induction on n.
Base Case, n = 1: It is clear that the lemma holds when m = n = 1 as SRev(D) = Rev(D)
for all one-dimensional D.
Inductive Hypothesis: When m = 1, and n = k, kSRev(D) ≥ Rev(D).
Inductive Step: Consider now the case where n = k + 1. Partition the support of D into
two parts: S1 where v1 ≥ vi for all i, and S2 the remainder. Let also s1 denote the probability
that a buyer’s valuation sampled from D lies in S1, and s2 the probability that it lies in S2 (so
s1 + s2 = 1). Finally, let D
(i) denote the distribution D conditioned on ~v ∈ Si.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 9 is that Rev(D) ≤ s1Rev(D(1))+ s2Rev(D(2)), so now
our goal is to bound s1Rev(D
(1)) and s2Rev(D
(2)).
By Lemma 10, s1Rev(D
(1)) ≤ s1Val(D(1)−1) + Rev(D1). Furthermore, we claim that
s1Val(D
(1)
−1) ≤ kRev(D1). To see this, observe that one truthful mechanism for selling just item
1 first samples ~v−1 ← D−1, and then sets a price of maxi≥2{vi}. Conditioned on ~v ∈ S1, the
item will always sell (by the definition of S1), and will generate revenue maxi≥2{vi} ≥ 1k
∑
i≥2 vi.
So the item sells with probability s1, and makes expected revenue at least
1
kVal(D
(1)
−1) when
this occurs. So we have just shown that Rev(D1) ≥ s1k Val(D
(1)
−1), as claimed. Taken to-
gether with the observation at the beginning of this paragraph, we have now shown that
s1Rev(D
(1)) ≤ (k + 1)Rev(D1).
Now we just need to bound s2Rev(D
(2)). Again by Lemma 10, s2Rev(D
(2)) ≤ s2Val(D(2)1 )+
Rev(D−1). By the induction hypothesis, Rev(D−1) ≤ kSRev(D−1), as it is a product distri-
bution over k items. So we just need to bound s2Val(D
(2)
1 ). We claim that s2Val(D
(2)
1 ) ≤
SRev(D−1). One way to sell items 2 through k+1 separately is to first sample a value v1 ← D1,
and set v1 as the price for each item. Conditioned on ~v ∈ S2, at least one item will sell (by
the definition of S2), and so the revenue will be at least v1. So with probability s2 at least one
item sells, and the expected revenue is at least Val(D
(2)
1 ) when this occurs. So we have just
shown that SRev(D−1) ≥ s2Val(D(2)1 ), as claimed. Taken together with the observation at the
beginning of this paragraph, we have now shown that s2Rev(D
(2)) ≤ (k + 1)SRev(D−1).
Taken together, we have now shown that Rev(D) ≤ (k+1)SRev(D−1)+(k+1)Rev(D1) =
(k + 1)SRev(D), completing the inductive step.
At this point, we have now shown that for m = 1 and all n ≥ 1, the statement of the lemma
holds. We conclude by proving the m > 1 case. To extend to m > 1 buyers, observe that any
truthful m-buyer mechanism M induces m truthful single-buyer mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mm such
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that Rev(M) =
∑
j Rev(Mj) (i.e. for each Mj, just sample m − 1 make-believe buyers and
have them play M). As each single-buyer mechanism has revenue no more than nSRev(D),
the mechanism M cannot have revenue more than nmSRev(D). ✷
C Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3: One could sell item i using a second price auction with reserve tiri to
guarantee revenue at least pitiri. If pi > 1/ti, then this contradicts the fact that the optimal
obtainable revenue is ri. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4: The distribution DCi is stochastically dominated by Di. Because only one
item is for sale, this implies that the optimal revenue is also less.
It is possible to obtain revenue piRev(D
T
i ) when selling to consumers from Di. Simply use
whatever mechanism is used to obtain revenue Rev(DTi ). With probability pi, the consumers
will be sampled fromDTi and yield this much revenue. Therefore, we must have piRev(D
T
i ) ≤ ri.
✷
Proof of Lemma 5: This is a direct application of Lemma 9. Applied here, observe that the
supports of DA form a partition of the support of D when taken over all A. ✷
D Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 7: var(F ) ≤ EX∼F [X2]. As the optimal revenue of F is at most c, we know
that PrX∼F [X ≥ x] ≤ c/x for all x. So
EX∼F [X
2] =
∫ t2c2
0
PrX∼F [X
2 ≥ x]dx
≤
∫ c2
0
dx+
∫ t2c2
c2
c/
√
xdx
= c2 + 2c
√
x|t2c2c2
= c2 + 2tc2 − 2c2 = (2t− 1)c2.
✷
E Omitted Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5: The following proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, with two dif-
ferences. First, we start with the bound Rev(DTA) ≤ a|A|SRev(DTA) (instead of Rev(DTA) ≤
|A|SRev(DTA)). Second, we have to make use of the fact that when there is only one item,
SRev(DTA) = Rev(D
T
A) and use this tighter bound whenever |A| = 1. We continue now with
the proof.
By hypothesis and Lemma 4, for A with |A| > 1 it holds that Rev(DTA) ≤ a|A|SRev(DTA) ≤∑
i∈A a|A|ri/pi. Combining with SRev(DTA) = Rev(DTA) for the case that |A| = 1, we can
rewrite ∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
i

ri + n∑
j=2
aj
∑
A∋i,|A|=j
pAri/pi


Observe that pA = (
∏
i∈A pi)(
∏
i/∈A(1 − pi)) ≤
∏
i∈A pi and thus pAri/pi ≤
∏
k∈A−{i} pkri. We
then have that ∑
A∋i,|A|=j
pAri/pi ≤ ri
∑
A∋i,|A|=j
∏
k∈A−{i}
pk.
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Furthermore, by Lemma 3, we have that each pi ≤ 1/(c · a · n), so we have
n∑
j=2
∑
A∋i,|A|=j
aj
∏
k∈A−{i}
pk ≤
n∑
j=2
aj
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
/(c · a · n)j−1
≤
n∑
j=2
j(n − 1)j−1
(j − 1)!cj−1aj−2nj−1
≤
n∑
j=2
2(j − 1)
(j − 1)!cj−1aj−2
≤
n∑
j=2
2
(j − 2)!cj−1aj−2
≤ 2e
1/ca
c
The last inequality makes use of the fact that
∑∞
j=0
1
j!cjaj
is the Taylor expansion for ex/ca
evaluated at x = 1. Adding back the j = 1 term that we handled outside the sum (making use
of the fact that SRev = Rev on single-item distributions) and summing over all i of ri times
the above inequality yields the proposition. ✷
Proof of Proposition 6: Note that Val(DC∅ ) =
∑
iVal(D
C
i ) ≤
∑
i
∫ cnri
0 Pr[v
∗
i > x]dx. The
last inequality would be equality if we replaced v∗i with a random variable that is the maximum
value in a sample drawn from DCi , but since v
∗
i stochastically dominates such a random variable,
we get an inequality instead. As the optimal revenue of Di is ri, this means that Pr[v
∗
i > x] ≤
min{1, ri/x}. So we have
Val(DCi ) ≤
∫ ri
0
dx+
∫ canri
ri
ri/xdx
= ri + ri(ln(c · a · n · ri)− ln(ri))
= ri(1 + lnn+ ln c+ ln a)
Summing this bound over all i yields the proposition. ✷
Proof of Proposition 7: Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that we may rewrite (using
Corollary 2): ∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
i
ri
∑
A∋i
4|A|pA = 4
∑
i
ri
∑
A∋i
|A|pA.
Again, the value
∑
A∋i |A|pA is exactly the expected number of items in the tail, conditioned
on i being in the tail. Therefore,
∑
A∋i |A|pA ≤ 1+
∑
j 6=i pj ≤ 1+ 1/4 by Lemma 3. Therefore,∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 5
∑
i ri = 5SRev. ✷
E.1 Proof of Proposition 8
To complete the proof of Proposition 8 we only need to prove the following claim.
Lemma 11. For the distribution D that is defined in Proposition 8 it holds that Rev(D) ∈
Ω(n log n) and PRev(D) ∈ O(n).
Proof. To see that Rev(D) ∈ Ω(n log n) consider the mechanism that sequentially visits the √n
buyers, allowing each to pick any set of
√
n/2 items that are still available, and pay c(
√
n log n)
for some c > 0 to be determined later. For each of the first
√
n/4 buyers, at least 7n/8 items
are remaining, and with very high probability the buyer has non-zero value for at least
√
n/2
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of these items. This is because the expected number of such items is 7
√
n/8, and the buyer has
non-zero value for each item independently. Conditioned on having non-zero value for at least√
n/2 items, Lemma 8 of [17] shows that with probability at least 1/2, the buyer is willing to
pay c
√
n log n for some constant c. Specifically, they show that the expected value of a consumer
whose value for k items is sampled i.i.d. from Equal-Revenue distributions truncated at M is
Θ(k logM), and that the variance of the consumer’s value is O(M). Plugging in our choices
of k and M , this means that the consumer’s expected value for
√
n/2 items is Θ(
√
n log n),
and the variance is O(n1/8). Meaning that with high probability, the consumer is willing to pay
Ω(
√
n log n). So the expected revenue from each of the first
√
n/4 buyers is at least c
√
n log n/2,
and therefore the total expected revenue from these buyers is Ω(n log n).
To see that PRev(D) ∈ O(n) consider the optimal partitioning mechanism, and denote the
size of part k in the partition by sk. Denote by BRev(k) and SRev(k) the revenue obtained by
bundling together and selling separately within part k, respectively. Note that
∑
k sk = n and
also that PRev(D) =
∑
kBRev(k). For all k such that sk ≤ n1/4, consider that the probability
that a fixed consumer has non-zero value for 12 or more items is bounded above by taking a
union bound over all
(n1/4
12
)
subsets of size 12 for which the consumer might have non-zero value
for every item, which occurs with probability n−1/2. Taking another union bound over all
√
n
consumers yields that the probability that any consumer has non-zero value for more than 12
items is at most n−5/2. So even if we could achieve the maximum possible welfare (= n1/4∗n1/8)
whenever this occurred, it would contribute negligible expected revenue. When every consumer
has non-zero value for 12 or fewer items in part k, we show that 24SRev(k) ≥ BRev(k). A
corollary of Theorem 5 in [13] is that the following auction obtains expected revenue BRev(k)/2:
pick a single reserve price p, and let any buyer pay price p and take all items in part k. So
for whatever price p guarantees BRev(k)/2, consider instead the mechanism that sets price
p/12 for each item separately. Then clearly, whenever some consumer is willing to pay p for 12
or fewer items, he is also willing to pay p/12 for at least one item separately. So we get that
24SRev(k) ≥ BRev(k). Also, a trivial upper bound on SRev(k) is the revenue obtainable
by selling goods separately without any supply constraint (i.e. the seller has infinitely many
copies of each good instead of just one). The latter quantity is obtained by setting price 1 for
each item to each buyer, yielding expected revenue exactly sk. So we have now shown that
BRev(k) ≤ 24sk + o(1) whenever sk ≤ n1/4.
On the other hand, maybe sk > n
1/4. In this case, the additive Chernoff bound says that
with probability at most e−2x
2
, the number of items for which a fixed buyer has non-zero value
is at most sk/
√
n +
√
skx.
11 Taking x = log n, we get that except with negligible probability,
every buyer has non-zero value for at most sk/
√
n +
√
sk log n items. As sk ≥ n1/4, this is at
most 2sk log(n)/n
1/4. So even if some buyer had the maximum possible value for every item he
valued above 0, his total value would be at most 2sk log(n)/n
1/8 < sk. So BRev(k) ≤ sk.
So we have now shown that
∑
k BRev(k) ≤ 25n, and therefore PRev(D) ∈ O(n).
F Omitted Proofs from Section 6
F.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 follows directly from the three lemmas below. We first present two helpful definitions.
Definition 2. We say that an n-dimensional distribution D is a point-mass in sum distribution
if when ~v is sampled from D,
∑
i vi = p with probability 1.
Definition 3. We say that an n-dimensional distribution D is symmetric if all marginals Di
are the same.
11This is obtained by plugging in t = x
√
sk, and E[
∑
i Xi] = sk/
√
n to the bound Pr[
∑sk
i=1 Xi ≥ E[
∑sk
i=1 Xi]+
t] ≤ e−2t2/sk .
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Lemma 12. For any n-dimensional distribution D, there exists a point-mass in sum n-dimensional
distribution D′ such that BRev(D′)/SRev(D′) ≥ BRev(D)/SRev(D).
Proof. Pick any instance D whose optimal grand bundle price is p, and the grand bundle sells
at price p with probability q. We will transform D into a point-mass in sum distribution D′
without decreasing the ratio BRev(D)/SRev(D).
If ~v denotes a sample from D, then observe that we may modify D to D′′ such that
BRev(D′′) ≥ BRev(D) and SRev(D′′) ≤ SRev(D) (and therefore BRev(D′′)/SRev(D′′) ≥
BRev(D)/SRev(D)). Whenever
∑
i vi > p, lower some values so that
∑
i vi = p. Whenever∑
i vi < p, set all vi = 0. It is clear that BRev(D
′′) ≥ BRev(D), as the consumer is still
willing to pay p with probability q. It is also clear that SRev(D′′) ≤ SRev(D) as we have only
lowered the consumer’s value for each item in a stochastically dominating way.
Next, define D′ to be the distribution that is exactly D′′ conditioned on
∑
i vi = p. Then
D′′ samples from D′ with probability q, and sets all values to 0 otherwise. It is also clear
that SRev(D′′) = qSRev(D′), because whatever price is set for each item sells with prob-
ability exactly q times the probability it sells when the consumer is drawn from D′ (be-
cause the consumer will never pay anything for the item if instead all values are 0). There-
fore, because BRev(D′′) = qp, and BRev(D′) = p, the two ratios are equal. That is:
BRev(D′′)/SRev(D′′) = BRev(D′)/SRev(D′). It is clear that D′ is a point-mass in sum
distribution.
Lemma 13. For any n-dimensional distribution D, there exists a symmetric n-dimensional
distribution D′ such that BRev(D′)/SRev(D′) ≥ BRev(D)/SRev(D). If D was point-mass
in sum, then D′ is point-mass in sum as well.
Proof. DefineD′ in the following way: sample ~v fromD, then randomly permute the components
of ~v to form ~v′. It’s clear that D′ is symmetric. It’s also clear that BRev(D) = BRev(D′).
We just have to show that SRev(D′) ≤ SRev(D). Let Di denote the ith marginal of D, D′j
denote the jth marginal of D′, vi denote a sample from Di, and v
′
j a sample from D
′
j . Then D
′
j
samples from each Di with probability 1/n.
Now observe that SRev(D′) =
∑
j maxp{pPr[v′j ≥ p]}. As each D′j samples each Di with
probability 1/n, we get that Pr[v′j ≥ p] =
∑
i Pr[vi > p]/n. this means that we can rewrite
SRev(D′) =
∑
j maxp{p
∑
i Pr[vi > p]/n} = maxp{p
∑
i Pr[vi > p]}. And observe also that
SRev(D) =
∑
imaxp{pPr[vi ≥ p]}. In other words, SRev(D′) is exactly SRev(D) after
swapping the order of the max and sum, which can only decrease SRev(D′).
Lemma 14. Let D be any symmetric point-mass in sum distribution. Then BRev(D) ≤
5 ln(n)SRev(D).
Proof. Without loss of generality, scale D down so that SRev(D) = n. We are essentially
asking how large Welfare(D) can possibly be subject to this, plus the symmetric point-mass
in sum constraint. Denote p =Welfare(D).
Note that each Di is supported on [0, p], and has expected revenue 1. So:
Welfare(Di) =
∫ p
0
Pr[vi > x]dx ≤
∫ 1
0
dx+
∫ p
1
1/xdx = 1 + ln p
We now observe that we have two estimates ofWelfare(D). First, we know thatWelfare(D) =
p. And second, we know that Welfare(D) =
∑
iWelfare(Di) ≤ n+ n ln p. Putting these to-
gether, we get that p must satisfy:
p ≤ n+ n ln p
For all n ≥ 2, this implies that p ≤ 5n lnn (as all p > 5n lnn violate the above inequality).
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F.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof of Proposition 10: Assume that n/(log n) is an integer. Partition n into log n sets
S1, . . . , Slogn, where |Sk| = n/(log n) for each k. The value distribution D is the following.
For each set Sk independently, with probability 1 − n−2k the value of every item is 0, and
with probability n−2k the value of each item is n2k times a random value sampled i.i.d from
a distribution F with CDF F (x) = 1 − x−1 for x ∈ [1, n] and F (x) = 1 for x > n (an
Equal-Revenue distribution with all mass above n moved to an atom at n). It is clear that
SRev(D) = n, since the optimal expected revenue of each item is 1. To prove the claim we
show that BRev(D) ∈ O(n) and that PRev(D) ∈ Ω(n log n).
To bound BRev(D) from above, consider the revenue generated by a grand-bundle price
of p. If p ≤ n then this revenue is at most n, so assume p > n. Choose ℓ ≥ 0 such that
p ∈ (n2ℓ, n2ℓ+2]. First, observe that clearly the total value for S1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Sℓ−1 is at most n2ℓ, as
there are only n items, and the value for each item is no more than n2ℓ−1. Next, observe that
with high probability, no Sk for k > ℓ contributes any value. This is because by the union bound,
the probability that any Sk, k > ℓ contributes non-zero value is at most
∑
k>ℓ n
−2ℓ ≤ 2n−2ℓ−2.
Next, we recall Lemma 8 of [17], which states that the bundling revenue obtained by selling x
items to a buyer whose value for each item is sampled i.i.d. from the Equal-Revenue curve is
O(x log x). Applied to Sℓ, that means that for any q > 0, the probability that the buyer’s value
for Sℓ exceeds q is O(min{n−2ℓ, n/q}) (because (n/ log n) · log(n/ log n) = O(n)). Including back
in the items in S1, . . . , Sℓ−1, this means that the probability that the buyer’s value for S1⊔. . .⊔Sℓ
exceeds q+n2ℓ is also O(min{n−2ℓ, n/q}). Finally, considering back Sk for k > ℓ, we know that
the probability that the buyer’s value for the grand bundle exceeds q+n2ℓ increases by at most
2n−2ℓ−2, which is O(1/p) for any p ∈ (n2ℓ, n2ℓ+2]. So for whatever price p we set, by taking
q = p− n2ℓ we get that the probability that the buyer’s value for the grand bundle exceeds p is
O(n/p), and we conclude that BRev(D) ∈ O(n).
To bound PRev(D) from below, consider the mechanism that for each set Sk sets the
optimal price for the bundle of all elements in that set. By Lemma 8 of [17] the optimal
expected revenue from each set Sk is at least (1/4)(n/(log n)) log(n/(log n)). Thus the total
revenue of this mechanism, and hence PRev(D), is at least (1/4)n log(n/(log n)) = Ω(n log n).
✷
G Computational Considerations
Our main result, Theorem 2, shows that 6 ·max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ Rev(D) for a single
buyer. This suggests a simple mechanism that obtains a constant approximation to the optimal
revenue: estimate SRev(D) and BRev(D), then run whichever of the two mechanisms obtains
higher revenue estimate. In this section we argue that a slight modification of this approach
can be implemented in polynomial time, given appropriate access to the distribution D.
We will assume that we are given a sample access to the distributions {Di}i. Unfortunately,
this kind of access cannot be sufficient to achieve any approximation, as a distribution might
only return an exponentially large non-zero value with exponentially small probability. We
thus make the additional weak assumption that for each Di we also have access to a price p
maximizing p(1 −Di(p)).12 Calculating SRev(D) and implementing the mechanism that sells
items separately is then trivial: one can directly optimize the revenue for each item, which
yields SRev(D) and the appropriate set of item prices.
Given that we can compute and implement SRev(D), what we would like is to also estimate
BRev(D) and compute an approximately optimal price for the grand bundle. One approach
would be to take samples from the distribution D, then optimize revenue for the observed
12For example, finding such a price is easy when each Di is a discrete distribution given as a sequence of (value,
probability) pairs.
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empirical distribution. However, this strategy again suffers from the sample-complexity issues
described above: the number of samples required to estimate BRev(D) might, in principle, be
quite large (again, certain items may have exponentially large value with exponentially small
probability). To overcome this difficulty, we will not actually attempt to estimate BRev(D);
instead, we will argue that it suffices to estimate the expected revenue from selling the grand
bundle at a particular price that we can compute explicitly. We will show that this revenue can
be estimated sufficiently well with a small number of samples.
To see why such an approach is plausible, note that Proposition 3 and the proof of Propo-
sition 4 together show that it isn’t necessary to always estimate BRev(D) accurately. All that
is required for our approximation is that when the sum of values is concentrated around its
expectation, and that expectation is large relative to SRev(D) (case 2 in Proposition 4), then
we must find a price for the grand bundle that extracts at least 1/4 of that expectation as
revenue. We will show that this can be achieved with a small number of samples.
More formally, consider the distribution DC∅ as used in Proposition 4. Proposition 3 plus
the proof of Proposition 4 together establish that if 6 · SRev(D) < Rev(D), then it must be
that
Pr
[∑
i
vi ≤ 2
5
·Val(DC∅ )
]
≤ 25
72
, (1)
in which case we show that selling the grand bundle at a price of 25 · Val(DC∅ ) yields at least
a 1/6 fraction of Rev(D). Since DC∅ is distribution D restricted to all values being at most
SRev(D) (which we can calculate), we can explicitly calculate the value of Val(DC∅ ). We can
then estimate Pr
[∑
i vi ≤ 25 ·Val(DC∅ )
]
by taking samples and testing explicitly. Standard
concentration bounds imply that log n/ǫ2 samples are sufficient to estimate this probability to
within an additive error of ǫ, with high probability. Thus, with high probability, this number
of samples is sufficient to determine whether inequality (1) (approximately) holds, and if so it
yields an estimate (to within a multiplicative factor of (1+ǫ)) of the revenue of selling the grand
bundle at price 25 ·Val(DC∅ ). Comparing this revenue to SRev(D), and implementing whichever
scheme yields more revenue, obtains a 1/6(1 + ǫ) approximation to the optimal revenue.
To summarize, we have shown that the following algorithm obtains a 6(1+ǫ)-approximation
to the optimal revenue, for any ǫ > 0:
1. Compute SRev(D) and p∗ := 25 ·Val(DC∅ ).
2. Take log n/ǫ2 samples from D. Let q be the fraction of samples ~v for which [
∑
i vi ≥ p∗].
3. If q < 47/72, or if q · p∗ < SRev(D), sell the items separately.
4. Otherwise, sell the grand bundle at price p∗.
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